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Abstract 
 
     This paper examines whether the geographic distance between subsidiaries of multinational 
banks and their headquarters is an important factor in determining the performance of the 
subsidiaries. Using various performance indicators of 340 subsidiaries in 54 emerging and 
developing economies from 69 global banks during the years 1994-2008, we find evidence that first, 
the distance constraint adversely affects loan growth, profitability and performance of foreign bank 
subsidiaries, and second, the unfavorable information asymmetry faced by foreign banks, due to the 
distance constraint, in financing foreign clients cannot be fully overcome by establishing their 
presence abroad such as setting up their foreign subsidiaries. We further examine if the effect of 
distance is symmetric across different banks and countries, and find the following various economic, 
financial and institutional factors to affect the strength of distance constraints in the multinational 
banking activities: the entry mode of foreign banks, the history of presence in local markets, the 
existence of credit information institutions, the cultural similarity between the home and host 
markets, financial depth, financial crisis periods, the stock market development, the banking market 
structure in host markets, and the hierarchy of the subsidiary in the multinational banking 
conglomerate.        
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the economic implications of distance in the realm of multinational 
banking, particularly the effect of the geographical distance between foreign bank subsidiaries 
and their headquarters on the performance of the foreign bank subsidiaries in emerging and 
developing countries. In the gravity model literature of international trade, it has been intensively 
studied and supported by numerous empirical studies that, after controlling for other factors, the 
exporter-importer distance imposes an important adverse effect on the bilateral trade links. In 
international finance, there have been several studies examining how the cross-border lending and 
portfolio investment activities are affected by geographical distance. For example, empirical 
papers, such as Portes et al. (2001), Portes and Rey (2005) and Buch (2005), found evidence that 
a longer distance in international banking have an adverse effect on cross-border lending or 
foreign asset holding, which is ascribed to higher informational costs as distance increases.  
Banks depend on information to identify good borrowers and determine their loan supply. 
Credible information is especially essential to provide larger loans (Degryse and Ongena (2005)). 
However, banks’ access to information (or ability to assess information) varies, thus affecting 
banks’ performance. Compared to domestic banks, foreign banks especially face more adverse 
information constraints when they provide cross-border credit, since they might be thousands 
miles away from their customers. The constraints faced by foreign banks include higher costs to 
either identify potentially good borrowers or monitor borrowers. Banks can only obtain less 
precise information for more distant loan applicants (e.g. Almanza (2002), Hauswald and 
Marquez (2006) and Carling and Lundberg (2007)). The information disadvantages become more 
conspicuous and challenging in multinational banking operations. 
Since the early 1990s, multinational banks have established a large number of subsidiaries 
outside their border. Foreign ownership in the banking system has increased significantly in a 
number of emerging economies. For example, as of end-2007, the share of foreign bank assets in 
banking sector total assets has reached 80 percent in Mexico, and exceeded the 90 percent level in 
several Central and Eastern European countries, such as Estonia, Romania, and the Czech Republic. 
(See BIS 2009, p.85) If a longer distance between the lender and the borrower really captures an 
adverse effect of information asymmetry associated with screening and monitoring, it is natural to 
ask if this “distance constraint” will stay the same or lose its edge when cross-border credit is 
substituted with local claims. In other words, we ask whether or not foreign banks are able to 
fully overcome the constraints of information asymmetry by shortening the geographical distance 
to customers through the establishment of their affiliates in borrowers’ country. In the extant 
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literature, however, only very few studies have examined if distance still plays any significant 
role in determining foreign banks’ performance in terms of lending, pricing and their profits in 
host markets. To our best knowledge, our study is the first to examine a role of distance in 
multinational banking using bank-level data of headquarters and their foreign subsidiaries and the 
geographical and cultural distance between the two.  
This paper addresses how the distance constraints faced by foreign banks affect their 
banking performance, and examines under what conditions the distance constraints may be 
alleviated or amplified. We specifically study whether and how foreign banks’ performance is 
affected by the distance between the host market where subsidiaries are located and the home 
market where their headquarters are located. Note that, in the research at the domestic level, 
distance is conventionally defined as the closeness between a loan officer and his borrowers (for 
example, Peterson and Rajan (2002)). The definition of distance and its implications in our paper 
are very different one from this conventional one. Although foreign banks can substitute cross-
border claims by local claims, it is far from certain that information barriers could be removed 
fully by a closer domestic vicinity to clients. Compared with domestic peers, foreign banks still 
likely face disadvantages in collecting information (especially “soft information”1
Following Mian (2006), “distance constraints” in our paper reflect the extent of the 
difficulties with which foreign banks can overcome disadvantages of asymmetric information in 
host markets, caused by distance from their headquarters in the home country. Since a farther 
distance in multinational banking reflects a higher level of difficulty to know their clients and 
markets, one would expect that the negative effect of distance on the banking performance tends 
to be stronger for more distant foreign banks.  How distance may constrain foreign banks’ 
activities, if any, have important policy implications for countries which liberalize their financial 
sectors by allowing more foreign banks to enter the host banking markets.  
) and 
identifying prime borrowers. As a result, foreign banks may still incur higher informational costs 
in their operation than domestic banks. The informational problem may disappear only after 
foreign banks have acquired the same pool of information as domestic banks, through many years 
of interaction with their clients in local markets.  
Our paper extends the extant literature in the following directions: First, using a new data set 
of distance between multinational bank subsidiaries and their headquarters at the individual bank 
level, we examine the impact of distance constraints to international banking operations. If 
multinational banks could overcome the informational barriers by setting up local presence, the 
distance between host and home markets would be insignificant in determining their banking 
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performance. Otherwise, a negative association between distance and banking performance can 
be explained as consistent evidence that foreign banks are still at the disadvantages of information 
asymmetry. Second, we focus our analysis on foreign banks in emerging and developing 
economies, where economic growth is pursued by opening up their financial sectors, as a result, 
witnessing an increase in the foreign bank presence. Since we use the samples from more than 
fifty emerging and developing countries, our results are more representative for developing 
countries in general. Third, we identify what are the specific amplifying or mitigating factors for 
the impact of distance in the multinational banking. These factors range from some characteristics 
of foreign bank subsidiaries, its hierarchical level in the conglomerate, the entry mode of foreign 
banks, and certain macroeconomic and financial conditions of the host countries.  
The main findings of this paper can be summarized as follows: First, we find evidence that 
distance constraints, in deed, adversely affect the performance of foreign banks. This finding 
suggests that foreign banks cannot fully overcome information asymmetry simply by establishing 
a local presence in the host banking market. As the distance from their headquarters increases, a 
foreign bank tends to lend its loans only at a lower growth rate. A longer distance also impedes 
foreign banks to obtain higher profit, which may reduce their capacity and incentive to supply 
credit over a long run. Corresponding to their lower growth rate of loans and profits, foreign 
banks also increase the share of non-lending assets in their portfolio, leading to inefficiency in 
capital allocation. Second, although in general a longer distance negatively affects foreign banks’ 
performance, its effect is not symmetric. The following factors are found to be able to alleviate 
the strength of distance constraints: the entry of foreign banks through the mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) mode, a longer history of presence in host markets, the existence of credit 
information institutions, the same language and region of host and home countries, higher 
financial deepening of host banking markets and highly developed stock market, a higher 
concentration level in the host banking market, and a higher hierarchy in its conglomerate. We 
also find that the effect of distance constraints becomes strong during crises than tranquil periods. 
Our results provide some useful policy implications for policy-makers in the host country of 
multinational banking.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature. Section 3 
introduces the regression model. Section 4 describes our dataset, and Section 5 reports the 
benchmark results. Section 6 examines various factors that may alleviate or aggravate the effects 
of distance constraints in multinational banking. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW: DISTANCE IN MULTINATIONAL BANKING 
In general, the availability and quality of information on borrowers play an important role in 
determining banks’ credit (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). When banks have more accurate 
information about their borrowers, they tend to lend more loans. Pagano and Jappelli (1993) 
argue that the information exchange among banks enables them to find good borrowers and may 
increase their lending. Jappelli and Pagano (2002) and Djankov et al. (2007) show that the 
countries in which lenders exchange information through credit information sharing institutions 
(public credit registries or private credit bureaus) are associated with a higher ratio of credit to 
GDP. Brown et al. (2009) find that information sharing improves the availability of loans at lower 
costs to firms, especially for opaque firms. In addition to increasing the volume of loans, 
improved information availability also affects banks’ performance by reducing debtors’ default 
rates (Klein (1992), Vercammen (1995), Padilla and Pagano (2000)), increases the competition in 
banking markets and hence lowering interest rates (Pagano and Jappelli (1993), Padilla and 
Pagano (1997)), and reduces firms’ incentive to over-borrow from multiple banks (Bennardo et al. 
(2008)). 
Banks are believed to have different abilities to collect and assess borrowers’ information. 
For example, large banks may be able to take the advantage of economies of scale from large 
information technology networks and hence are better at assessing “hard information”. By 
contrast, small banks may be better at collecting and assessing “soft information” through loan 
officers by personal interactions. Stein (2002) suggests that large, hierarchical banks would have 
comparative disadvantages in assessing soft information relative to small banks.  Consistent with 
his argument, Cole et al. (1999) show that large banks tend to employ standard criteria obtained 
from financial statements in the loan decision process, but small banks deviate from these criteria 
by relying to a larger extent on the soft information such as the character of the borrower. 
Moreover, young banks may be less effective to distinguish good borrowers from bad ones 
because of their short history of presence and less often interaction with potential clients. Archaya 
et al. (2002) find that a bank’s monitoring effectiveness is dampened when the bank expand to 
newly-entered industries. 
Distance is a practically useful proxy for the difficulties to acquire and communicate 
information, especially soft information (Hauswald and Marquez (2000), Berger et al. (2001), 
Petersen and Rajan (2002), Mian (2006), and Agarwal and Hauswald (2007)). A longer distance 
between banks and borrowers would make information collection and monitoring more costly and 
then deters banks from providing more loans, especially the relationship loans which depend 
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more on local knowledge and personnel contacts. Almanza (2002) suggests that the resources 
spent by banks on monitoring increases with the distance between the bank and its debtors. He 
also finds that banks with higher capital are more willing to lend to distant borrowers.  
How distance affects the price of loans could be ambiguous. On one hand, more distant 
borrowers would cost banks more resources to assess and monitor, hence banks would pass on 
this cost into the interest rate on loans. On the other hand, banks would extract rents from closer 
borrowers by charging higher rates since otherwise the borrowers would have to switch to more 
distant competing banks and pay higher interest rates. Degryse and Ongena (2005) find that loan 
interest rates tend to decrease with the distance between firms and lenders and increase with the 
distance between the firm and competing banks. The reason is explained as that more distant 
banks have only weaker market power and hence will charge borrowers lower interest rates. 
Agarwal and Hauswald (2007) find results in line with Degryse and Ongena (2005), and suggest 
the physical distance between bank and borrowers is actually a proxy for bank’s different degree 
of information asymmetry. Mistrulli and Casolaro (2008) find that the interest rates on loans are 
negatively correlated with the distance between the bank headquarters and the borrower. 
Huaswald and Marquez (2006) derive a negative relationship between loan rates and the distance 
of borrowers to relationship banks, but a positive relationship between the rates and the distance 
to transactional banks.  
In other research (e.g. Berger and DeYoung (2001)), distance is also used as a proxy for the 
agency problem when a subsidiary is located far away from senior managers, hence with an 
increasing distance to the final decision makers, the subsidiaries may have less lending and lower 
profit efficiency. This strand of argument is consistent with Stein (2002). There is substantial 
evidence that information asymmetry would cause biases in the investment of market participants, 
for example, the literature on the well known “home bias” in assets holding (e.g. French and 
Poterba (1991), Gehrig (1993), Tesar and Werner (1995), Kang and Stulz (1997), Lewis (1999), 
Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001)). Portes and Rey (2005) provide an excellent survey on the 
literature of this issue.  
It is only recent when a few empirical studies investigate the effects of distance on 
determining various specific types of international financial transactions. Most of these works 
find that distance is an important determinant of cross-border assets holding or international bank 
flows. Applying the gravity model methodology, Portes et al. (2001) and Portes and Rey (2005) 
show that geographical distance is negatively associated with the volume of international 
financial assets transactions, and the result is explained by a positive correlation between 
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information friction and distance. Buch (2005) finds consistent evidence that banks hold 
significantly lower assets in distant foreign markets, and the importance of distance for holding 
assets abroad has not declined in European countries with technological progress over time. He 
also finds that distance constraints have not changed in its impact on cross-border asset holdings 
by the multinational banking sector over time during the period 1983-1999. Papaioannou (2005) 
also uses geographical distance to proxy the transaction and information costs, and find it is 
inversely associated with the cross-border bank flows. Herrero and Martinez Peria (2007) find 
that the informational costs significantly affect the share of local claims (to total claims) of 
foreign banks. Carey and Nini (2007) find that banks display home bias by providing more 
syndicated loans to their domestic borrowers than to foreign ones.  
Siregar and Choy (2009) studies the determinants of the loans from international banks from 
OECD countries to East Asian countries, and  find a negative relationship between the source-
recipient geographical proximity and the amount of loans. Similar results are also found in Wei 
and Wu (2001), although they do not specifically address the relationship between distance and 
cross-border bank lending.  It is worthwhile to note that, although there is overwhelming evidence 
that a farther distance between source and recipient countries would negatively affect investors or 
banks’ decision to obtain foreign assets, there is likely a positive effect as well. The correlation of 
business cycle may likely decline in distance, hence a financial investment in remote countries 
might reward investors a higher return by portfolio diversification. If this is the case, the distance 
between source and recipient countries may be found positively related with international capital 
flows. Nevertheless, the extant empirical evidence seemingly suggests that this positive effect is 
practically dominated by the negative effects from information asymmetry. 
However, research is still scant on the effect of distance from their headquarters on the 
performance of foreign bank subsidiaries which are located in host markets. If the geographical 
distance captures most of the information barriers between a lender and its continents-away 
borrowers, we expect that the distance constraints would not play any significant role if lenders 
could successfully know about their borrowers by setting up a local presence and narrowing the 
vicinity to their borrowers. So far, only a few papers have addressed the effects of the host-home 
market distance on foreign banks’ local claims in the host country. Berger et al. (2001) find that 
for small business in Argentina, foreign banks headquartered in South America tend to provide 
more credit than foreign banks headquartered in other continents. Mian (2006) examines the 
credit from foreign banks in Pakistan, and finds that a greater cultural and geographic distance 
between the headquarters and their local branches prevents foreign banks to lend to 
  
8 
informationally opaque but fundamentally sound firms. Claessens and van Horsen (2009) find 
that foreign banks from a home country geographically or culturally close to the host country 
perform better than distant foreign banks.2
The interpretation of distance constraints as information asymmetry has been supported in 
the literature. Several studies have also presented evidence that foreign banks may only serve the 
sectors which are less subject to information asymmetry. Clarke et al. (1999) observe the banking 
sector in Argentina and find that foreign banks concentrate their business in the industries that are 
less information asymmetric. Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) find that in the case of Latin 
American banks de novo foreign banks charge lower spreads than mergers & acquisitions foreign 
banks, and interpret that de novo foreign banks with less information on the host banking markets 
has to focus on the most transparent sector, which are more likely competitive sectors. 
Accordingly, de novo foreign banks have to charge lower spreads than M&A foreign banks. The 
results from these two works are consistent with the suggestion made by Dell’Ariccia and 
Marquez (2004) that foreign banks will enter the sectors where their information disadvantages 
are smaller. 
  
3. MODEL 
We set up the empirical model to examine how the distance from their headquarters affects 
the performance of foreign bank subsidiaries in host markets. is the banking performance is 
measured using four dimensions: (1) the growth rate of loans (in real terms); (2) the price charged 
by banks, represented by net interest margin; (3) the holding of non-lending assets, measured by 
the share of “other earning assets” to total bank assets; and (4) the profits of banks, proxied by the 
return on equity (ROE). We find that these four dimensions only modestly correlated. (Table A1) 
We use the following benchmark model for the estimation of the role of distance constraints to 
the banking performance of foreign bank subsidiaries: 
 
 
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , ,
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
i j k l t j l i t j t
k t l t i j k l t
Y c distance bank  characteristics host  characteristics
            parent  characteristics home characteristics
α β δ
λ γ ε
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ +
   (1) 
 
where the dependent variable Yi,j,k,l,t represents the banking performance of foreign bank 
subsidiary i of conglomerate k of the home country l in host country j in year t . distancej,l is the 
geographical proximity between the host country j and the home country l. (bank 
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characteristics)i,t is a vector of subsidiary i’s bank characteristics, including its liquidity, 
capitalization, size and riskiness. (host characteristics)j, t is a vector of macroeconomic variables 
in host market j, including the growth rate of real GDP, the change in unemployment rate, foreign 
exchange depreciation rate (against US dollar), and a dummy of (expansionary) monetary policy 
with the value of 1 for an easy monetary policy and the value of 0 otherwise. (parent 
characteristics)k, t includes the financial strength of the parent bank k, such as the mass of the 
conglomerate, liquidity and capitalization. (home characteristics)l, t represents the macroeconomic 
conditions in the home country l, including the growth rate of real GDP, the change in 
unemployment rate and a dummy of monetary policy. εi,j,k,l,t is the idiosyncratic error. α, β, δ, λ 
and γ are the coefficients to be estimated.  
Among the coefficients which we will estimate, α is of special interest, which is expected to 
reflect the sensitivity of foreign bank subsidiaries’ performance to the distance constraints that 
they face. Distance is calculated as the geodesic distance between the geographic centers of the 
host and the home countries by applying Vincenty formula. We take logarithms for distance, 
since the marginal effect of the distance constraints may diminish as distance increases. If foreign 
banks are subject to higher informational costs in their operation, it is expected that a longer 
distance would be associated with a lower growth rate in loans. In addition, if the distance 
constraint hinders foreign banks to find good business opportunities, we should expect that they 
have to hold more non-lending assets, like deposits in other banks, securities, bonds and 
government treasury bills; hence the share of other earning assets to total assets will be increasing 
with the distance. Foreign subsidiaries’ higher holding of non-lending assets, compared to lending 
assets, suggests a less efficient allocation of scarce financial resources in multinational banking.  
How would the distance constraint affect the interest rate charged by foreign banks? The 
answer is not straightforward. On one hand, if a longer distance captures a higher cost to identify 
and monitor borrowers (or monitor managers), foreign banks may pass on this cost and charge a 
higher interest rate. On the other hand, a longer distance would cause less information about the 
host market and potential prime borrowers. This will drive foreign banks to concentrate their 
lending in more transparent industries which are more likely competitive than other opaque 
industries, and force banks to charge only a lower interest rate. Therefore, it seems how distance 
would affect interest rate is left as an empirical question. If a longer distance creates the 
informational disadvantage for foreign banks, we may reasonably expect that profits would 
decrease as distance increases.  
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Following the standard practice, we include bank characteristics of foreign subsidiaries in 
the explanatory variable set to control for various types of financial constraints on the subsidiaries. 
It is likely that a longer distance from the headquarters actually represents a weaker financial 
strength of the subsidiary, especially when the conglomerate establishes a “weaker” (say, smaller, 
less liquid or less capitalized) subsidiary in a distant overseas market. This possibility can be 
controlled by including the subsidiary-level bank characteristics in the explanatory variable set. 
The correlation of distance and subsidiary characteristics are reported in Table A2, which 
indicates that the correlations are very mild in magnitude. Another argument that may arise is that 
a more distant foreign bank may have a lower growth rate of loans because of a lower demand 
from the host market. To control for the demand effect at the bank level and the macroeconomy 
level, we add a riskiness measure at the individual bank level and host country macroeconomic 
variables. The former, measured by the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans of a subsidiary 
controls for the heterogeneity across subsidiary banks’ clients, while the latter controls for the 
heterogeneous demand factors across host countries. The variables of “bank characteristics” and 
“host characteristics” are the “pull factors” in determining the behavior of foreign banks.  
The liquidity of banks is measured by the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. A more liquid 
bank tends to increase its credit more quickly. The capitalization of banks is proxied by the ratio 
of equity over total assets. A better capitalized bank is expected to have faster growing in its loans. 
The size of an individual bank measures the dominance of the bank in the host banking sector. 
The relative size of a bank is obtained by using the ratio of the total loans of the bank to the total 
domestic credit in the host economy. The riskiness faced by an individual bank is measured by 
the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans for a bank. In order to address the possible 
endogeneity problem of subsidiaries’ characteristic variables in our model, we use one-year 
lagged values for those variables.  
“Parent characteristics” and “home characteristics” are included to control for the “push 
factors” of foreign banks’ performance in host markets. The former controls for the effects of the 
financial strength of the conglomerate on the subsidiaries’ behavior,3 while the latter controls for 
the force that may lead the parent banks to seek external lending (via the oversea subsidiaries) 4. 
The liquidity and capitalization of the conglomerates are measured in the same way for those for 
subsidiaries. The mass of a parent bank is proxied by the logarithm of its total assets in term of 
U.S. dollars. The correlation between distance and parent bank characteristics are reported in 
Table A3. The correlation between distance and parent bank mass is relative large (around 0.50), 
probably indicating that a large multinational bank can expand their foreign subsidiary network 
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farther than a small multinational bank. We present evidence shortly that after controlling for the 
effect of conglomerate mass, distance is still a significant determinant of banks’ performance. 
In order to test whether the effect of distance constraints is symmetric across banks and host 
markets and to identify specific amplifying or mitigating factors for the strength of the distance 
constraints, we extend the benchmark model by adding interaction terms: 
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
i j k l t j l j l i t
j t k t l t i j k l t
Y c distance factor factor distance bank  characteristics
            host  characteristics parent  characteristics home characteristics
α ρ σ β
δ λ γ ε
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ × + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
 (2) 
 
where factor represents an examined factor that may alleviate (or multiply) the effect of distance, 
and  factor × distancej,l is its interaction term with distance. We examine various factors 
including: (1) the entry mode of foreign banks (de novo or M&As); (2) the length of presence in 
host markets; (3) the existence of credit information institutions; (4) the same languages, legal 
systems, and relegion in the host and home countries; (5) the level of financial deepening in the 
host banking market; (6) the level of development of stock market; (7) the degree of 
concentration in the host banking market, and (8) the hierarchy level of the subsidiary in its 
conglomerate. More detailed discussion on each of the above factors will be made when we 
discuss the empirical results in Section 6. A summary of all variables and their data sources is 
provided in Table 1. 
For the estimation, we apply the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimator, which 
allows for the AR(1) autocorrelation within banks and heteroskedasticity across banks. We 
introduce country dummies and time-fixed effects in the estimation to control for other 
unaccounted sources of the differences in the bank performance across countries and years. 
 
4. DATA 
We construct unbalanced panel dataset for the estimation by using bank-level annual 
observations of balance sheet and income statements retrieved from Bureau van Dijk‘s 
BankScope database. Our data cover 340 foreign subsidiaries of 69 multinational banks from 
1994 to 2008. All selected multinational banks are universally regarded as large banks with total 
assets of more than $521 billion on average.5 We include only commercial bank subsidiaries in 
our dataset to reduce the possible bias due to the different nature and business scope of various 
non-commercial banks. We focus our analysis on the foreign subsidiaries of multinational banks 
located in a total of 54 emerging and developing countries. The list of selected multinational 
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banks and the distribution of their subsidiaries in the interested countries is provided in Appendix 
Table A4. 
A bank is defined as a foreign subsidiary if at least 50% of the entity’s assets are owned by 
a multinational bank which is headquartered in another country.6
We use unconsolidated data for subsidiaries in principle and consolidated data are used 
only when unconsolidated data are not available for that bank. In our dataset, only 6% of 
observations are consolidated for subsidiaries. For parent banks, by contrast, we use consolidated 
data to reflect the state of the conglomerate instead of the only holding company. Since all 
selected subsidiaries are small compositions (in terms of their assets) in the conglomerate, using 
consolidated data for the parent bank would not cause serious problem of endogeneity 
 We take the following steps to 
track the affiliation of a subsidiary to its parent bank over the period of 1994-2008. First, we 
check the subsidiary information of selected multinational banks recorded in BankScope, which 
identifies the ownership for some banks in the most recent year of recording. Second, we check 
the global presence of parent banks and their chronological history from their websites to pin 
down the establishment of their subsidiaries in foreign countries. Third, we review the profile of 
each individual subsidiary bank and its historical evolution from its website. In most cases, it is 
highlighted in the bank’s profile about its incorporation and changes of its ownership. Fourth, we 
depend on another comprehensive database, SDC Platinum, which records detailed information 
on mergers and acquisitions. We collect data on when a bank in the host country was acquired by 
or merged into the conglomerate of the parent bank in the home country. Finally, if we are still 
unable to identify the ownership of the bank after going through these four steps, we resort to 
various other information sources, such as banks’ annual reports, central bank publications, and 
Internet news reports on changes in the bank ownership and affiliation. 
7
We drop the outliers by applying the following steps: First we remove the observations if 
the subsidiaries’ annual growth rate of total assets exceeds 300%, which could be the result of 
mergers and acquisitions in the host country; second, we drop the data if the growth rate of loans 
is higher than 400%, which could occur in the early years of the subsidiaries or in the financial 
turmoil; third, we delete the observations when subsidiaries’ riskiness is larger than 100% or 
lower than -100%. We lose quite a number of banks from the removal of the outliers and the 
usage of one-year lags for subsidiary characteristics variables, but still have around 250 bank 
observations for our regression. 
.  
We collect macroeconomic variables from International Financial Statistics (IFS). We 
resort to various sources to collect data for the factors that may affect the effects of distance 
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constraints. These variables and their sources are represented in Table 1, and will be further 
explained in Section 6.  
 
5. BENCHMARK RESULTS: DOES DISTANCE MATTER FOR THE PERFORMANCE 
OF FOREIGN BANK SUBSIDIARIES? 
We first estimate the equation (1) and examine whether the distance between the host and 
the home markets plays an important role for the performance of foreign bank subsidiaries 
located in the host countries. The results are reported in Table 2. 
First of all, after controlling for all other factors affecting the bank performance, we find 
distance is still an important determinant of banks’ behavior. The coefficient on the variable 
distance is negative and statistically significant in all regressions. A more distant foreign 
subsidiary is shown to supply loans at only a lower growth rate. This finding is consistent with 
the literature of “information asymmetry” in that higher informational costs to identify and 
monitor borrowers would discourage banks from providing more credit. Consistent with the 
findings in Petersen and Rajan (2002), Degryse and Ongena (2005) and Agarwal and Hauswald 
(2007), distance is found negatively correlated with net interest margin, implying that a foreign 
bank from a more distant home country charge borrowers lower interest rates. The reason can be 
that a distant foreign bank is characterized with more disadvantageous informational possession 
and consequently only lower market power, which prevents them from charging higher interest 
rates to borrowers. Another explanation is that a more distant foreign subsidiary will be forced to 
specialize only in the most transparent industries. These industries are more likely to be 
competitive and hence banks have to charge only lower interest rates.  
Since distant foreign banks own less information to find good business opportunities, they 
may have to hold more non-lending assets such as deposits in other banks, securities, bonds and 
treasury bills. This conjecture is supported by the positive coefficient of distance in the regression 
of the share of other earning assets. Finally, distance is negatively associated with return on 
equity, which suggests that a more distant foreign bank be less profitable than other closer foreign 
banks. It is worthwhile to note that our results are essentially consistent with the insights of 
“gravity model”. Multinational banks tend to allocate their loans to more proximate clients, as 
represented as the “home bias” proposition in that they hold financial assets issued by closer (or 
domestic) debtors over-proportionately.  
Our finding suggests that information asymmetry cannot be completely overcome by 
establishing a local presence of multinational banks in the host country. As Mian (2006) pointed 
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out using the case of the Pakistani banking, one of the policy implications is that foreign bank 
participation in developing countries may face a significant challenge in advancing their financial 
development by attracting multinational banks from abroad. Since foreign banks are constrained 
by the asymmetric information, they may not be interested in serving some firms (for example, 
the opaque small firms), which would negatively impact the economic growth in host countries. 
A higher holding of non-lending assets by foreign banks may also result in a less efficient 
allocation of scarce financial resources. Moreover, since a higher information barrier lowers 
foreign banks’ profitability, it may undermine their incentive and capability to provide long-term 
credit. A pool of financially healthy domestic banks equipped with better capacity for collecting 
soft information for loan would compensate the disadvantage of foreign banks in assessing 
information and work as a necessary complement in developing host banking markets. 
We also find some other interesting results. For example, it is shown that higher liquidity 
enables banks to increase credit at a higher growth rate and charge a lower interest spread, which 
is consistent with prior works like Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Gambacorta (2005, 2008). 
Capitalization is positively associated with net interest margin. This finding is consistent with 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998), who find that higher-capitalized banks tend to get the lower 
cost for funding. Larger and more risky banks tend to provide more stable credit, but charge 
higher interest rate and possess a higher ratio of non-loan assets. Host macroeconomic conditions 
affect banks’ loans as well. The coefficient on the growth rate of real GDP is positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting a higher economic growth stimulate higher demand for bank 
credit. The coefficient on the change in unemployment rate is negative, implying that aggregate 
demand and hence the demand for credit would decrease when labor market is tight.  
When the host central bank conducts an expansionary monetary policy, banks significantly 
lend more credit at lower interest margin than when monetary policy turns tightened. Banks 
increase their lending when domestic currency is depreciated, probably because values for foreign 
banks’ assets denominated in local currency increase, and at the same time increase interest 
spread, which reflects uncovered interest parity when foreign currencies are relatively 
strengthened. We also find the financial strength of parent banks affect subsidiaries’ lending. 
Banks from a large and highly liquid conglomerate increase loans at a lower rate. The result that 
subsidiaries’ performance is affected by the financial strength of their parent banks is in line with 
the literature of “internal capital market” like Gilbert (1991), Houston et al. (1997), and De Haas 
and van Lelyveld (2009). We find weak evidence that home countries macroeconomic variables 
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affect subsidiaries’ behavior, hence foreign banks are not found to import fluctuations into host 
countries. 
 
6.  FURTHER RESULTS: WHAT FACTORS MODIFY THE EFFECT OF DISTANCE 
CONSTRAINTS? 
We next test if the adverse effect of distance on bank performance is symmetric across 
banks and countries, or put differently, if there is any factor that may buffer or amplify the impact 
of distance. We do that by adding the tested factor and also its interaction with distance. A 
significant coefficient on the interaction term can be translated as the factor would affect banks’ 
performance through changing the effects of distance.8
6.1. Entry mode 
  
Foreign banks can set up overseas subsidiaries through either de novo establishment or 
mergers & acquisitions (M&A). Rather than gathering the information of markets and potential 
borrowers from scratch, a foreign bank established through the M&A entry can inherit the pool of 
information from its predecessor, hence largely overcome the barrier of information asymmetry. 
We test the effect of entry mode on the distance constraints by introducing the interaction term 
distance × dummy (M&A), where dummy (M&A) has a value of 1 if the foreign subsidiary is built 
through acquiring a local bank, and it has a value of 0 if the foreign subsidiary is built though de 
novo establishment.  
The results are reported in Table 3. We find the coefficient on distance × dummy (M&A) is 
positive and statistically significant in the regressions of the loan growth rate and net interest 
margin, but insignificant in the share of other earning assets and return on equity. These results 
indicate that a foreign bank entered through the M&A mode is less constrained by asymmetric 
information than a de novo foreign bank in providing loans and setting interest rates.  
Van Tassel and Vishwasrao (2007) argue that foreign banks choose an M&A entry mode in 
order to capture the information endowment of domestic banks. Lehner (2009) suggests that 
foreign banks with superior screening technology would prefer an M&A entry to a greenfield 
entry. On the other hand, Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) find that de novo foreign banks charge 
lower spreads than mergers & acquisitions foreign banks in the Latin American banking sector. 
They interpret the findings that de novo foreign banks possess only the least information about 
the host markets and thus need to focus on the most transparent sectors, which are more likely 
competitive sectors. Accordingly, de novo foreign banks have to charge lower spreads than M&A 
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foreign banks. Our finding that foreign subsidiaries entered through an M&A mode are less 
affected by distance than those entered through a de novo mode is consistent with the arguments 
that foreign subsidiaries entered through M&As have better information on the host banking 
market than those entered through greenfields, and are able to charge lower loan rates. 
6.2. History of presence 
Foreign banks can accumulate information about host markets and their clients in the 
process of their operations; hence controlling for all else, a foreign bank which has already been 
operating in the market for years would possess a richer pool of information than a bank newly 
entered. We collect the data on banks’ history from their profiles and BankScope, and use the 
number of years of operation in the host markets as the history of presence variable. For foreign 
banks that were established by M&A, its length of history started back to the date when the 
acquired bank was built. The effect of length of history is detected by adding the interaction term 
distance × history, and the results are reported in Table 4. 
As expected, the interaction distance × history is positive and statistically significant in 
regressions of the loan growth rate and net interest margin, and negative in the share of other 
earning assets. A foreign bank with a longer operation history in the host market is shown to be 
less affected by distance, and accordingly lends more loans, sets higher interest margin and holds 
less non-loan assets. These results are consistent with our conjecture that “senior” banks know the 
market better than their “junior” counterparts.  
6.3. Information institutions 
Credit information institutions can help banks to have better access to the information on 
potential borrowers and overcome the adverse selection caused by information asymmetry. 
Djankov et al. (2007) find evidence that the existence of credit information institutions boosts 
more private credit in their sample of 129 countries. Brown et al. (2009) find that the information 
sharing provided by credit information institutions improves the availability and lower cost of 
credit, especially to opaque firms.  
In practice, credit information institutions include public credit registries and private credit 
bureaus. Good examples of the former institutions include databases managed by a government 
agency (usually the central bank) that collects information on the standing of borrowers in the 
financial market and make it available to actual and potential lenders. The latter institutions 
include private firms or non-profit organizations that maintain databases on the standing of 
borrowers to facilitate information exchange among banks and other financial institutions.  We 
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construct three dummy variables--dummy (information institution), dummy (public credit registry) 
and dummy (private credit bureau)--to capture, respectively, the existence of either public credit 
registries or private credit bureaus, public credit registries only, or private credit bureaus only. 
The main data source for the credit information institutions, public and private, is the World Bank 
Doing Business database.  
First, we only include dummy (information institution) and its interaction with distance in 
regression (Table 4. panel A). We find the existence of the information institutions dampens the 
adverse effects of distance on the loan growth rate and net interest margin. A same distant foreign 
bank located in a host country with either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau 
provide more loan and can charge higher interest spread than its counterparts in host countries 
without credit information institutions. Next, we test the separate effects of public credit registry 
and private bureau in affecting the role of distance constraints. We add both dummy (public credit 
registry) and dummy (private credit bureau) and their interactions with distance in regression 
(Table 4. panel B). We find both types of information institutions contribute to lowering the 
effects of distance on the loan growth rate and the interest spread. Public credit registry may also 
help foreign subsidiaries to hold less non-lending assets. These results are consistent with the idea 
that foreign banks can retrieve information from credit information institutions and use them in 
evaluating the loan applications. Our findings suggest that the construction of credit information 
institutions seems to be a valuable component for the policy of financial liberalization in 
developing countries.  
6.4. Language, legal system and region 
Intuitively, if a multinational bank expands its subsidiaries into a host market which is 
culturally more similar to its own home market, it may incur lower informational costs. In order 
to test the proposition, we use three dimensions to measure the cultural similarity between host 
and home countries: the (same) language and legal system in the host and home countries, and the 
(same) region where host and home countries are located.9 In the extant literature, the impact, on 
multinational banking, of whether the borrower and the bank are located in the same region as a 
proxy of the cultural distance have been examined (see Mian (2006) and Claessens and van 
Horen (2009).) However, the examination that whether these national features can weaken or 
aggravate the negative effects of distance on foreign subsidiaries behavior is still scant. We 
construct three dummy variables, dummy (same language), dummy (same legal system) and 
dummy (same region), to capture, respectively, if the host and home countries have the same 
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official languages, the same legal origins, and are geographically in the same region.10
We add these three dummies and their interaction with distance respectively in regressions. 
The results are reported in Table 6. The coefficient on dummy (same language) is statistically 
significant in the regressions of the loan growth rate and the share of other earning assets, 
supporting the idea that the same language used in both host and home countries reduces the 
effects of distance in credit provision and assets allocation. This result implies that foreign banks 
would possess and communicate more precise information about their clients by avoiding extra 
costs from inter-lingual translation. The coefficient on dummy (same region) is statistically 
significant and shows an expected sign in determining net interest margin and ROE. That is, 
compared to its same distant counterparts, a foreign bank can own more market power, charge 
higher interest margin, and earn higher profits if its headquarters is located in the same region of 
the host market. However, the coefficient on dummy (same legal system) is not statistically 
significant in any regression, providing little evidence that same legal systems may strengthen or 
dampen the impact of distance constraints. 
 The main 
data sources are CIA World Factbook and La Porta et al. (1998). 
11
6.5. Financial deepening 
 
Banks and other financial institutions arise to ameliorate the problems created by 
asymmetric information; hence the information of potential borrowers will be more transparent in 
a more developed financial market. We test if foreign banks face less severe or more strict 
distance constraints when they are operating in financially more developed host markets.  
The degree of financial development is measured using the ratio of private credit by 
depository banks to GDP, which are collected from the financial structure database provided by 
Beck (2009). The results are reported in Table 7. We find that the coefficient on the interaction 
term of distance with host financial deepening is statistically significant in determining the 
growth of loans, net interest margin and ROE, suggesting that a higher financial development 
plays a buffering role to the adverse effects of distance.  In a host country with higher financial 
depth, a foreign bank increases its credit at higher growth rate, have a larger interest spread and 
hence higher profits, compare to other distant foreign banks. Our finding implies that, as the host 
financial sector develops, foreign banks would encounter declining information asymmetry and 
provide more financing in host countries.   
Why foreign banks are subject to less adverse distance constraints in a more developed 
banking market? One explanation is that, financial depth also reflects the dependence of firms on 
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banks to finance their investment. The more firms are dependent on banks, the more actively they 
provide verifiable evidence for their creditworthiness, hence the less adverse the informational 
asymmetry is.    
6.6. Crisis 
Banks may encounter worse informational problem when the economy falls in crisis, which 
can greatly deteriorate firms’ operation outcomes and obscure their business prospects. Mishkin 
(1990) describes the nature of financial crisis as a disruption of markets in which the asymmetric 
information problems of adverse selection and moral hazard become much worse. We test 
whether or not crises would deteriorate the effects of distance constraints.  
A dummy veriable, dummy (financial crisis), is constructed equal to 1 if the host country 
experiences a systematic banking crisis, using the data in Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and 
Laeven and Valencia (2008). The results are reported in Table 8. 
The coefficient on the interaction term distance × dummy (financial crisis) is found negative 
and statistically significant in regressions of loan growth and net interest margin, which is 
consistent with our expectation that information asymmetry becomes deteriorated during crisis 
periods. Given the same distance, foreign banks in host crises are more hesitant to expand their 
credit, and have only narrowed the interest spread.  To avoid confusion, note that our result does 
not contradict with the conventional observations that in crisis banks charge higher interest rate to 
borrowers. The individual term dummy (financial crisis) is shown to have a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient, indicating that interest rates are higher during the crisis 
periods. However, a negative and statistically significant coefficient on distance × dummy 
(financial crisis) only suggests that the adverse effect of distance on interest spread is 
strengthened by crises, probably because the increase in the loan interest rate is offset by an  
increase in the cost of funding. 
6.7. Stock markets 
The development of stock market may influence the capacity of collecting information on 
borrowers by banks. The intuition is that a more developed stock market will have firms’ 
financial information more transparent and easier to access by banks, especially for those publicly 
listed companies. In this section, we test how the stock market development influences the effects 
of distance on foreign banks’ performance. 
We use three variables to measure the development in stock market: namely, number of 
listed companies as the share of listed companies divided by total population in host countries, 
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stock market capitalization as the value of listed shares divided by GDP, and stock market 
turnover rate as the ratio of the value of total shares traded to market capitalization. We collect 
the data from the structure database provided by Beck (2009).We add these three variables and 
their interactions with distance in our regressions. The results are reported in Table 9. 
We find the coefficient on number of listed companies is statistically significant in all 
regressions and show the expected sign, supporting a proposition that an increase in the number 
of listed companies improves the informational problem (Table 9 panel A). Given same distance 
as its peers, a foreign bank subsidiary in a host country where there are more publicly listed 
companies tends to provide more lending, be able to charge higher interest rates, hold less non-
lending assets, and earn higher profits. The coefficients on stock market capitalization is positive 
in regressions of loan growth and net interest margin (Table 9 panel B), while the coefficient on 
stock market turnover rate is statistically significant in regressions of loan growth and the share 
of other earning assets (Table 9 panel C). Both results are in line with the proposition that foreign 
banks incur lower informational costs in the host country where stock markets are well developed. 
Our results also shed some light on the specialization of foreign banks in serving domestic 
clients. Since publicly listed companies are usually large companies in an economy, the finding 
that the effects of informational problem on foreign banks’ behaviors can be improved by the 
development of stock market suggests that foreign banks may lend more credit to large 
companies, and may exclude small firms whose information is limited because the financial 
information on those firms are not publically available in stock markets. 
6.8. Concentration 
The dependence of banks on the quality of information on borrowers may be affected by the 
competition level in the financial market. Empirical evidence on this proposition is still far from 
conclusive. (See Archaya et al. (2002), Boot and Thakor (2002), Huaswald and Marquez (2006), 
Mistrulli and Casolaro (2008) and Zarutski (2008)) 
We test the effects of competition on how distance influence foreign subsidiaries’ lending. 
We use the level of banking concentration as a proxy for the competition in host banking markets. 
It is widely accepted that the more concentrated the banking sector is, the less competitive it is. 
Concentration is defined as the share of total assets owned by the largest three banks in total 
assets of banking sector. The data is selected from the financial structure database provided by 
Beck (2009). 
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The results are reported in Table 10. The coefficient on the interaction variable, distance × 
concentration, is found to be positive and statistically significant in regressions for loan growth 
rate and interest rate, and negative in regression for the share of other earning assets. These 
results suggest that the adverse distance effects are less pronounced in a more concentrated (less 
competitive) banking sector. A same distant foreign subsidiary tends to increase its loans at a 
higher rate, charges higher interest rate, and holds less non-loan assets in a more concentrated 
market. Archaya et al. (2002) argue that a bank’s monitoring effectiveness is dampened when the 
bank expand to more competitive sectors, results in lower quality of loans. Huaswald and 
Marquez (2006) suggest that banks tend to decrease their investment to acquire borrowers’ 
information when competition is intensified. Our results are in line with this finding. 
6.9. Hierarchy 
Stein (2002) shows that loan officers in hierarchically complex conglomerates will have a 
lower incentive to collect information about borrowers. This is because they do not generally 
have decision making authority, and instead they have to report that information to their 
supervisors. Based on this argument, we may expect that, a subsidiary with higher hierarchy in 
the conglomerate will be less separate from the ultimate decision makers, more likely influence 
CEO’s decisions, and hence have stronger incentive to identify potential prime borrowers. 
Therefore, a subsidiary with a higher hierarchy might be less affected by the distance constraint 
than a peer with a lower hierarchy. 
We use the relative size of bank assets of the subsidiary in the conglomerate to proxy its 
hierarchy, that is, the ratio of the subsidiary’s total assets to the total assets of the conglomerate. 
When a subsidiary manages more assets in the conglomerate, it implies that it is standing on a 
higher hierarchy.  
The results are reported in Table 11. The coefficient on the interaction term, distance × 
hierarchy, shows an expected sign and is statistically significant in all bank performance 
dimensions. Compared to same distant peers, a higher hierarchical subsidiary tends to provide 
more loans, charge higher interest rate, hold less other earning assets, and earn higher profits. 
These results suggest that a higher standing in the conglomerate may help banks less constrained 
by information asymmetries. This provides consistent evidence that the managers of higher 
hierarchical subsidiaries have stronger incentive and capacity to collect the information on 
borrowers, and implies that parent banks may “export” their superior expertise to higher 
hierarchical subsidiaries than lower ones. (Berger and De Young (2001) and Stein (2002))  
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6.10. Robustness tests 
It can be reasonably argued that the above-discussed factors may be correlated to each 
other and hence they actually capture something alike. In this section we test the robustness of 
our finding by add all significant factors in regression. For instance, we exclude the insignificant 
factors and add only dummy (M&A), history, dummy (information institutions), dummy (same 
language), host financial deepening, dummy (financial crisis), number of listed companies, stock 
market capitalization, stock market turnover rate, concentration and hierarchy and their 
interaction with distance into the regression of the loan growth rate.  
The results are reported in Table 12. To no surprise, some factors lose their significance 
since multicollinearity can be hardly avoided in this regression. Even though we cannot simply 
rule out the importance of those variables just because they are not statistically significant in 
these augmented regressions, we find stronger evidence for some factors since their significance 
remains. It is confirmed that there are many factors which mitigate or multiply the role of 
distance constraints in the loan performance of foreign subsidiaries in multinational banking. 
They include the loan growth rate, the history of presence, the existence of credit information 
institutions, the same language in host and home markets, and the financial development. For net 
interest margin, we find robust support for the force of the history of presence, the same region 
where host and home countries are located, and the financial development level. For the share of 
other earning assets, the history of presence, the same language, the turnover rate in stock market, 
and the hierarchy hold on their significance. For ROE, all added factors are shown to be 
statistically significant, namely, the same region, the financial development, the number of listed 
companies and the hierarchy of the subsidiary.  
We also conduct a robustness test to check if there have been any systematic shifts over 
years in the role of distance constraints on the performance of foreign subsidiary banks. 
According to the estimation results, we are not able to get statistically significant evidence for the 
system shift over time in our sample observations. This finding is consistent with Bush (2005) 
which reports that the importance of distance for the foreign assets holdings of banks has not 
changed for commercial banks from G-5 countries doing business in 50 host countries for the 
period 1983-1999. However, we expect that the role of distance on the performance of foreign 
banks in the emerging and developing host countries diminishes over the long run due to the 
advancement of information technology, communication infrastructure, and globalization of the 
banking industry. 
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7. Conclusion 
This paper addresses the significance of the host-home distance in affecting the 
performance of foreign subsidiaries in host country markets. Our results suggest that, first, the 
distance constraint adversely affects loan growth, profitability and performance of foreign bank 
subsidiaries, and second, the unfavorable information asymmetry faced by foreign banks, due to 
the distance constraint, in financing foreign clients cannot be smoothed out simply by establishing 
their presence abroad such as setting up their foreign subsidiaries. Foreign banks still need to 
have years of operation to learn the markets and accumulate more precise information pool for 
potential borrowers.  
The effect of distance is not symmetric across banks and countries. We identify various 
factors, affecting the role of distance in multinational banking. They are associated with bank 
characteristics (entry mode and history of presence), national features (existence of credit 
information institutions, cultural similarity with home countries, financial development, crises, 
stock market development, and the level banking market concentration) and the conglomerate 
structure (hierarchy). We find evidence that they play an effective role in determining the strength 
of distance on foreign subsidiaries’ behavior and performance. Our results imply that, given the 
same distance from their home markets and other controlled variables, foreign banks would show 
heterogeneity in their performance, depending on where they are located. 
Our findings in this paper have some important policy implications. A policy that 
discourages mergers & acquisitions of foreign banks to domestic banks but encourage de novo 
establishment may produce less optimal outcome, since de novo foreign banks face more adverse 
distance constraints and information asymmetry in identifying their potential clients. Entry 
permission is shown not to be sufficient for good performance of foreign banks in host markets. 
The governments in host countries need to proactively establish and develop credit information 
institutions as a complement of the financial liberalization policy. Another important policy 
implication is that the policy-makers in developing countries should not ignore the financial 
health and development of domestic banks, since foreign banks are subject to the informational 
problem and may cause inefficient allocation of scarce financial resources in the host countries. 
The financial development cannot be achieved only by allowing the entry of foreign banks. A 
pool of strong domestic banks, with informational advantages, can compensate the disadvantage 
of foreign banks with distance constraints and information asymmetry, and act as an indispensible 
participant in the financial markets. 
  
24 
References 
Agarwal, Sumit and R. Hauswald, 2007, “Distance and Information Asymmetries in Lending Decisions,” 
Federal Researve Bank of Chicago Proceedings, Iss. May, pp. 183-204.  
Almanza, Andres, 2002, “A Model of Competition in Banking: Bank Capital vs Expertise,” Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, Vol. 11, pp. 87-121.  
Archaya, Viral, I. Hasan, and A. Saunders, 2002, “The Effects of Focus and Diversification on Bank Risk 
and Return: Evidence from Individual Bank Loan Portfolios,” BIS Working Paper No. 118. 
Ashcraft, Adam, 2008, “Are Bank Holding Companies a Source of Strength to Their Banking 
Subsidiaries?” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 40, pp. 273-294.  
Bank for International Settlement (BIS), 2009, “Capital Flows and Emerging Market Economies,” CGFS 
Papers No. 33, January. 
Beck, Thorsten, A. Demirguc-Kunt and R. Levine, 2003, “Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin 
Matter,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 31, Iss. 4, pp. 653-675.  
Beck, Thorsten, A. Demirguc-Kunt, and R. Levine, 1998, “A New Database on Financial Development and 
Structure,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2146. 
Beck, Thorsten and A. Demirguc-Kunt, 2009, “Financial Institutions and Markets across Countries and 
over Time – Data and Analysis,” World Bank Working Paper. 
Bennardo, Alberto, M. Pagano and S. Piccolo, 2008, “Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights and 
Information Sharing,” CSEF Working Paper 211. 
Berger, Allen and R. DeYoung, 2001, “The Effects of Geographic Expansion on Bank Efficiency,” Journal 
of Financial Services Research, Vol. 19, Iss. 2, pp 163-184.  
Berger, Allen, L. Klapper and G. Uddell, 2001, “The Ability of Banks to Lend Informationally Opaque 
Small Business,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 25, pp. 2127-2167.  
Boot, Arnoud and A. Thakor, 2002, “Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?” Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 55, Iss. 2, pp. 679 – 713.  
Brown, Martin, T. Jappelli and M. Pagano, 2009, “Information Sharing and Credit: Firm-Level Evidence 
from Transition Countries,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 18, Iss. 2, pp. 151-172.  
Buch, Claudia, 2005, “Distance and International Banking,” Review of International Economics, Vol. 13, 
Iss. 4, pp. 787-804.  
Carling, Kenneth and S. Lundberg, 2005, “Asymmetric Information and Distance: An Empirical 
Assessment of Geographical Credit Rationing,” Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 57, Iss. 1, pp. 39-
59.  
Campello, Murillo, 2002, “Internal Capital Markets in Financial Conglomerates: Evidence from Small 
Bank Responses to Monetary Policy,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, No. 6, pp. 2773-2805. 
Caprio, Gerard and D. Klingebiel, 2003, “Episodes of Systematic and Borderline Financial Crises,” World 
Bank Research Working Paper.  
Carey, Mark and G. Nini, 2007, “Is the Corporate Loan Market Globally Integrated? A Pricing Puzzle,” 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 62, Iss. 6, pp. 2969-3007.  
  
25 
Coval, Joshua and T. Moskowitz, 1999, “Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in Domestic 
Portfolios,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, Iss. 6, pp. 2045-2073.  
Coval, Joshua and T. Moskowitz, 2001, “The Geography of Investment: Informed Trading and Asset 
Prices,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 109, Iss. 4, pp. 811-841.  
Claessens, Stijn, N. van Horsen, T. Gurcanlar and J. Mercado, 2008, “Foreign Bank Presence in 
Developing Countries 1995 – 2006: Data and Trends,” Working Paper. 
Claessens, Stijn and N. van Horsen, 2009, “Being a Foreigner among Domestic Banks: Asset or Liability,” 
MPRA Paper No. 13467. 
Clarke, Geroge, R. Cull, L. D’Amato and A. Molinari, 1999, “The Effect of Foreign Entry on Argentina’s 
Domestic Banking Sector,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2158. 
Cole, Rebel, L. Goldberg and L. White, 1999, “Cookie-Cutter vs Character: The Micro Structure of Small 
Business Lending by Large and Small Banks” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Proceedings, Iss. May, pp 
362-389.  
De Haas, Ralph and I. van Lelyveld, 2010, “Internal Capital Markets and Lending by Multinational Bank 
Subsidiaries,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 19, pp. 1-25. 
Degryse, Hans and S. Ongena, 2005, “Distance, Lending Relationships and Competition,” Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 60, Iss. 1, pp 231-266.  
Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni and R. Marquez, 2004, “Information and Bank Credit Allocation,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 72, pp 185-214.  
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli and H. Huizinga, 1998, “Determinants of Commercial Bank Interest Margins and 
Profitability: Some International Evidence,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1900. 
Djankov, Simeon, C. McLiesh and A. Shleifer, 2007, “Private Credit in 129 Countries,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 84, Iss. 2, pp 299-329.  
French, Kenneth and J. Poterba, 1991, “Investor Diversification and International Equity Markets,” 
American Economic Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2, pp 222-226. 
Gambacorta, Leonardo, 2005, “Inside the Bank Lending Channel,” European Economic Review, Vol. 49, 
Iss. 7, pp. 1737-1759.   
Gambacorta, Leonardo, 2008, “How do Banks Set Interest Rates?” European Economic Review, Vol. 52, 
Iss. 5, pp. 792-819.  
Gehrig, Thomas, 1993, “An Information Based Explanation of the Domestic Bias in International Equity 
Investment,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 95, Iss. 1, pp. 97-109.  
Gilbert, R. Alton, 1991, “Do Bank Holding Companies Act as “Sources of Strength” for Their Bank 
Subsidiaries,” Economic Review,  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, January/February. 
Goldberger, Linda, 2005, “The International Exposure of U.S. Banks,” NBER Working Paper, No. 11365. 
Hauswald, Robert and R. Marquez, 2000, “Relationship Banking, Loan Specialization and Competition,” 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Proceedings, May, pp. 108-131.  
Hauswald, Robert and R. Marquez, 2006, “Competition and Strategic Information Acquisition in Credit 
Market,” Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 19 (3), pp. 967-1000. 
  
26 
Herrero, Alicia G. and M.S. Martinez Peria, 2007, “The Mix of International Banks’ Foreign Claims: 
Determinants and Implications,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 31, pp 1613-1631. 
Holod, Dmytro and Joe Peek, 2006, “Capital Constraints, Asymmetric Information and Internal Capital 
Markets in Banking: New Evidence,” Working paper. 
Houstan,  Joel, C. James and D. Marcus, 1997, “Capital Market Frictions and the Role of Internal Capital 
Markets in Banking,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 46, pp. 135-164 
Houston, Joel and C. James, 1998, “Do Bank Internal Capital Market Promote Lending?” Journal of 
Banking & Finance, Vol. 22, pp. 899-918.  
Jappelli, Tullio and M. Pagano, 2000, “Information Sharing in Credit Markets: A Survey,” CSEF Working 
Paper 36. 
Jappelli, Tullio and M. Pagano, 2002, “Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-Country 
Evidence,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 26, Iss. 10, pp. 2017-2045.  
Kang, Jun-Koo and R. Stulz, 1997, “Why is There a Home Bias? An Analysis of Foreign Portfolio Equity 
Ownership in Japan,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 46, Iss. 1, pp 3-28.   
Kashyap, Anil and J. Stein, 2000, “What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say about the Transmission 
of Monetary Policy,” American Economic Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 3, pp 407-428.  
Klein, Daniel, 1992, “Promise Keeping in the Great Society: A Model of Credit Information Sharing,” 
Economics and Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 117-136. 
La Porta, Rafael, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, 1998, “Law and Finance,” Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 106, Iss. 6, pp. 1113-1155.  
Laeven, Luc and F. Valencia, 2008, “Systematic Banking Crises: A New Database,” IMF Working Paper 
WP/08/224. 
Lehner, Maria, 2009, “Entry Mode Choice of Multinational Banks,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 
33, Iss. 10, pp. 1781-1792.  
Lewis, Karen, 1999, “Trying to Explain Home Bias in Equities and Consumption,” Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 37, Iss. 2, pp 571-608. 
Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad and A. Mody, 2004, “How Foreign Participation and Market Concentration 
Impact Bank Spreads: Evidence from Latin America,” World Bank Policy Research Paper 3210.  
Mian, Atif, 2006, “Distance Constraints: the Limits of Foreign Lending in Poor Economies,” Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 61, Iss. 3, pp. 1465-1505.   
Mishkin, Frederic, 1990, “Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises: A Historic Perspective,” NBER 
Working Paper No, 3400. 
Mistrulli, Paolo E. and L. Casolaro, 2008, “Distance, Lending Technologies and Interest Rates,” Working 
Paper. 
Padilla, A. J., and M. Pagano, 2000, “Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device,” 
European Economic Review, Vol. 44, pp. 1951-1980.  
Padilla, A. J., and M. Pagano, 1997, “Endogenous Communication among Lenders and Entrepreneurial 
Incentives,” Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 10, pp. 205-236.  
  
27 
Pagano, Marco and T. Jappelli, 1993, “Information Sharing in Credit Markets,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 
48, Iss. 5, pp. 1693-1718.  
Papaioannou, Elias, 2005, “What Drives International Bank Flows? Politics, Institutions and Other 
Determinants,” European Central Bank Working Paper, No. 437. 
Peek, Joe and E. Rosengren, 2000, “Collateral Damage: Effects of the Japanese Real Estate Collapse on 
Credit Availability and Real Activity in the United States,” American Economic Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1, pp. 
30-45.  
Peterson, Mitchell and R. Rajan, 2002, “Does Distance Still Matter? The Information Revolution in Small 
Business Lending,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, Iss. 6, pp. 2533-2570.  
Portes, Richard, H. Rey and Y. Oh, 2001, “Information and Capital Flows: the Determinants of 
Transactions in Financial Assets,” European Economic Review, Vol. 45, pp. 783-796.  
Portes, Richard and H. Rey, 2005, “The Determinants of Cross-Border Equity Flows,” Journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 65, pp. 269-296.  
Siregar, Reza Y. and K. M. Choy, 2009, “Determinants of International Bank Lending from Developed 
World to East Asia,” MPRA Working Paper, No. 14989. 
Stein, Jeremy, 2002, “Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized vs Hierarchical 
Firms,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, pp. 1891-1921. 
Stiglitz, Joseph and A. Weiss, 1981, “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,” American 
Economic Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 3, pp. 393-410.   
Tesar, Linda and I. Werner, 1995, “Home Bias and High Turnover,” Journal of International Money and 
Finance, Vol. 14, Iss. 4, pp. 467-492.  
Van Tassel, Eric and S. Vishwasrao, 2007, “Asymmetric Information and the Mode of Entry in Foreign 
Credit Markets,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 31, Iss. 12, pp. 3742-3760.  
Vercammen, James, 1995, “Credit Bureau Policy and Sustainable Reputation Effects in Credit Markets,” 
Economica, Vol. 62, Iss. 248, pp. 461-478. 
Wei, Shang-Yin and Y. Wu, 2001, “Negative Alchemy? Corruption, Composition of Capital Flow and 
Currency Crisis,” NBER Working Paper, No. 8187. 
Zarutskie, Rebecca, 2008, “Competition and Specialization in Credit Markets,” Working Paper. 
  
28 
Table 1: List of variables 
Variable Description Source Mean Std. dev. Median 
Distance The logarithms of geodesic distance between the geographic centers of the 
host and home countries (in 1000 kilometers).  
Authors’ own calculation based 
CIA World Factbook 
1.190 1.189 1.591 
Loan growth rate The annual growth rate of real loans (in %). BankScope 23.533 54.209 14.157 
Net interest margin The ratio of net interest income to total earning assets of banks (in %). BankScope 5.093 4.572 4.040 
Share of other 
earning assets 
The ratio of non-loans assets to total earning assets of banks (in %). BankScope 42.282 23.657 39.927 
ROE Return on equity (in %). BankScope 9.416 27.531 11.450 
Liquidity The ratio of liquid assets to total assets (in %). BankScope 38.253 19.256 35.738 
Capitalization The ratio of equity to total assets (in %). BankScope 13.237 10.038 10.368 
Size Relative size of a bank in the banking sector, measured by the ratio of the 
bank’s loans to the banking sector total loans (in %). 
BankScope and IFS 3.827 6.848 1.244 
Riskiness The ratio of loan loss provision to total loans (in %). BankScope 1.897 5.031 .835 
Host GDP growth 
rate 
The growth rate of real GDP in host countries (in %). IFS 5.493 5.183 5.050 
Host change in 
unemployment 
First-order difference in unemployment rate in host countries (in %). IFS -.125 1.460 -.200 
Dummy (host 
monetary policy) 
A dummy = 1 if the host central bank conducts expansionary monetary 
policy = 0 otherwise. 
IFS .588 .492 1 
Host depreciation 
rate 
Foreign exchange depreciation rate of host currency against U.S. dollar. IFS 3.810 23.415 0.000 
Parent bank mass The logarithms of the total assets of the conglomerate (in billions of U.S. 
dollar). 
BankScope 12.583 1.177 12.714 
Parent bank liquidity The ratio of liquid assets to total assets of the conglomerate (in %). BankScope 28.023 12.793 26.678 
Parent bank 
capitalization 
The ratio of equity to total assets of the conglomerate (in %). BankScope 5.459 2.432 5.049 
Home GDP growth 
rate 
The growth rate of real GDP in home countries (in %). IFS 2.565 2.436 2.172 
Home change in 
unemployment 
First-order difference in unemployment rate in home countries (in %). IFS -.290 .891 -.299 
Dummy (home 
monetary policy) 
Dummy = 1 if the home central bank conducts expansionary monetary 
policy = 0 otherwise. 
IFS .608 .488 1 
Dummy (M&A) Dummy = 1 if the foreign subsidiary is established by merger & 
acquisition = 0 if established from scratch 
Banks’ profile, SDC platinum, 
annual reports, and etc 
.438 .496 0 
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History The logarithms of the length of presence (in years) in host countries.  Banks’ profile,  BankScope, 
SDC platinum, annual reports, 
and etc 
2.853 .975 2.639 
Dummy (information 
institution) 
Dummy = 1 if either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau 
exists in the host country = 0 otherwise. 
The World Bank “Doing 
Business” database 
.870 .336 1 
Dummy (same 
language) 
Dummy = 1 if the host and home countries have the same official 
language. 
CIA World Factbook .162 .368 0 
Dummy (same legal 
system) 
Dummy = 1 if the host and home countries have the same legal system. La Porta et al. (1998), CIA 
World Factbook 
.471 .499 0 
Dummy (same 
region) 
Dummy = 1 if the host and home countries are located in a same region. CIA World Factbook .433 .495 0 
Host financial 
deepening 
Ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP (in %). Financial Structure Database by 
Beck (2009) 
39.577 29.825 29.019 
Dummy (financial 
crisis) 
Dummy = 1 if the host market experienced a systematic banking crisis in 
given year 
Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) 
Laeven and Valencia (2008) 
.268 .443 0 
Number of listed 
companies in host 
stock market 
Number of publicly listed companies per 10K population. Financial Structure Database by 
Beck (2009) 
.254 .456 .060 
Stock market 
capitalization 
The ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (in %). Financial Structure Database by 
Beck (2009) 
43.082 56.009 25.982 
Stock market 
turnover 
Stock market turnover ratio. Financial Structure Database by 
Beck (2009) 
32.494 62.529 23.397 
Concentration Assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks 
(in %). 
Financial Structure Database by 
Beck (2009) 
54.962 15.613 56.141 
Hierarchy The ratio of the assets owned by the subsidiary to the total assets of the 
conglomerate (in %). 
BankScope 1.172 2.564 .238 
 
 
  
30 
 
Table 2. Estimation results on the effects of distance on bank performance 
Dependent variables 
 Loan growth 
rate 
Net interest 
margin 
Share of other 
earning assets 
ROE 
Distance -4.927*** 
(1.296) 
-.210* 
(.114) 
1.224** 
(.581) 
-1.224** 
(.574) 
Liquidity .153*** 
(.044) 
-.019*** 
(.002) 
.593*** 
(.018) 
.008 
(.017) 
Capitalization .124 
(.100) 
.024*** 
(.006) 
.085** 
(.035) 
-.137*** 
(.031) 
Size -.404*** 
(.122) 
.030*** 
(.009) 
.094** 
(.047) 
.369*** 
(.062) 
Riskiness -.697*** 
(.195) 
.037*** 
(.011) 
.127* 
(.068) 
.081 
(.117) 
Host GDP growth rate 1.213*** 
(.169) 
-.032*** 
(.008) 
-.143** 
(.065) 
.381*** 
(.074) 
Host change in unemployment -.787* 
(.424) 
-.042 
(.026) 
-.183 
(.156) 
.019 
(.186) 
Dummy (host monetary policy) 5.642*** 
(1.215) 
-.184*** 
(.062) 
.488 
(.438) 
-.278 
(.508) 
Host depreciation rate .085*** 
(.027) 
.013*** 
(.002) 
.001 
(.010) 
-.032** 
(.016) 
Parent bank mass -1.732** 
(.837) 
-.031 
(.065) 
2.707*** 
(.315) 
1.347*** 
(.392) 
Parent bank liquidity -.190*** 
(.066) 
-.015*** 
(.004) 
.140*** 
(.025) 
-.090*** 
(.027) 
Parent bank capitalization -.036 
(.309) 
.099*** 
(.026) 
-.048 
(.114) 
.134 
(.142) 
Home GDP growth rate -.323 
(.228) 
-.003 
(.018) 
.085 
(.103) 
-.312** 
(.122) 
Home change in unemployment -.756 
(.675) 
.015 
(.040) 
-.196 
(.217) 
-.466* 
(.281) 
Dummy (home monetary policy) .569 
(1.868) 
.019 
(.088) 
.357 
(.690) 
.351 
(.799) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (no. of banks) 1307 (254) 1307 (254) 1301 (253) 1304 (254) 
Goodness of fit .183 .368 .693 .150 
 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses denote errors of the coefficients. *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%. 
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Table 3. Estimation results on the effects of entry mode on distance constraints 
Dependent variables 
 Loan growth 
rate 
Net interest 
margin 
Share of other 
earning assets 
ROE 
Distance -6.827*** 
(1.379) 
-.192** 
(.093) 
1.257** 
(.617) 
-.962 
(.670) 
Dummy (M&A) 3.618* 
(2.048) 
.166 
(.118) 
.373 
(.814) 
-1.601* 
(.892) 
Distance × Dummy (M&A) 2.574** 
(1.151) 
.270*** 
(.079) 
.096 
(.480) 
-.966 
(.608) 
Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (no. of banks) 1307 (254) 1307 (254) 1301 (253) 1304 (254) 
Goodness of fit .190 .280 .695 .147 
 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses denote errors of the coefficients.  *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%. 
 
 
Table 4. The effects of history of presence on distance constraints 
Dependent variables 
 Loan growth 
rate 
Net interest 
margin 
Share of other 
earning assets 
ROE 
Distance -12.459*** 
(2.190) 
-.341** 
(.155) 
3.784*** 
(.843) 
-.370 
(1.142) 
History -1.253 
(1.163) 
.320*** 
(.082) 
1.597*** 
(.407) 
-.351 
(.595) 
Distance × History 2.623*** 
(.622) 
.096** 
(.046) 
-.949*** 
(.218) 
-.276 
(.312) 
Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (no. of banks) 1290 (251) 1290 (251) 1284 (250) 1287 (251) 
Goodness of fit .187 .264 .703 .143 
 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses denote errors of the coefficients.  *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%. 
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Table 5. Estimation results on the effects of credit information institutes on distance constraints 
Dependent variables 
 Loan growth 
rate 
Net interest 
margin 
Share of other 
earning assets 
ROE 
Panel A: Public registry or private bureau 
Distance -10.242*** 
(2.792) 
-.625*** 
(.125) 
1.206 
(.816) 
-.539 
(1.044) 
Dummy (information institutes) -5.369** 
(2.611) 
-.316** 
(.142) 
-3.121*** 
(1.017) 
1.230 
(.950) 
Distance × Dummy (information 
institutes) 
5.579** 
(2.567) 
.319*** 
(.112) 
-.336 
(.794) 
-.946 
(.971) 
Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (no. of banks) 1307 (254) 1307 (254) 1301 (253) 1304 (254) 
Goodness of fit .183 .322 .634 .153 
Panel B: Public registry and private bureau 
Distance -11.137*** 
(1.994) 
-.656*** 
(.122) 
1.900** 
(.769) 
-.422 
(.940) 
Dummy (public registry) -2.986 
(4.235) 
.173 
(.172) 
.141 
(1.655) 
4.200** 
(1.712) 
Distance × Dummy (public registry) 3.965** 
(1.721) 
.349** 
(.167) 
-2.182** 
(.863) 
-1.510 
(.971) 
Dummy (private bureau) -2.539 
(2.355) 
-.336** 
(.144) 
-4.259*** 
(1.109) 
.381 
(1.022) 
Distance × Dummy (private bureau) 4.629*** 
(1.584) 
.192* 
(.106) 
.045 
(.740) 
-.312 
(.807) 
Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (no. of banks) 1307 (254) 1307 (254) 1301 (253) 1304 (254) 
Goodness of fit .164 .329 .635 .143 
Note: The numbers in parentheses denote errors of the coefficients.  *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. 
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Table 6. Estimation results on the effects of language, legal system and region on distance constraints 
Dependent variables 
 Loan growth 
rate 
Net interest 
margin 
Share of other 
earning assets 
ROE 
Panel A: Same language 
Distance -7.944*** 
(1.387) 
-.304** 
(.123) 
1.378** 
(.630) 
-1.659** 
(.729) 
Dummy (same language) -12.349 
(9.121) 
1.697** 
(.760) 
7.940** 
(3.469) 
3.132 
(5.024) 
Distance × Dummy (same language) 9.435** 
(4.192) 
-.468 
(.324) 
-2.969* 
(1.613) 
1.016 
(2.087) 
Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (no. of banks) 1307 (254) 1307 (254) 1301 (253) 1304 (254) 
Goodness of fit .179 .370 .689 .155 
Panel B: Same legal system  
Distance -5.058*** 
(1.289) 
-.252* 
(.129) 
3.101*** 
(.514) 
-1.431** 
(.670) 
Dummy (same legal system) 1.233 
(1.696) 
-.444*** 
(.141) 
-.255 
(.739) 
-.828 
(.820) 
Distance × Dummy (same legal 
system) 
-.831 
(1.083) 
.076 
(.093) 
.236 
(.482) 
.035 
(.569) 
Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (no. of banks) 1307 (254) 1307 (254) 1301 (253) 1304 (254) 
Goodness of fit .176 .365 .669 .151 
Panel C: Same region  
Distance -6.364** 
(2.841) 
-1.064*** 
(.266) 
.681 
(1.228) 
-4.414** 
(2.166) 
Dummy (same region) -4.287 
(6.453) 
-1.631*** 
(.609) 
.682 
(2.749) 
-7.185 
(4.892) 
Distance × Dummy (same region) -3.726 
(3.393) 
1.206*** 
(.296) 
-.587 
(1.513) 
4.326* 
(2.376) 
Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (no. of banks) 1307 (254) 1307 (254) 1301 (253) 1304 (254) 
Goodness of fit .177 .391 .682 .152 
Note: The numbers in parentheses denote errors of the coefficients. *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. 
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Table 7. Estimation results on the effects of financial deepening on distance constraints 
Dependent variables 
 Loan growth 
rate 
Net interest 
margin 
Share of other 
earning assets 
ROE 
Distance -7.680*** 
(1.903) 
-.964*** 
(.190) 
4.078*** 
(.647) 
-3.013*** 
(.898) 
Host financial deepening -.067 
(.088) 
-.041*** 
(.005) 
-.139*** 
(.027) 
-.075** 
(.031) 
Distance × Host financial deepening .053** 
(.023) 
.011*** 
(.001) 
.002 
(.008) 
.029** 
(.012) 
Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (no. of banks) 1279 (248) 1279 (248) 1273 (247) 1276 (248) 
Goodness of fit .182 .377 .677 .156 
Note: The numbers in parentheses denote errors of the coefficients.  *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. 
 
Table 8. Estimation results on the effects of financial crisis on distance constraints 
Dependent variables 
 Loan growth 
rate 
Net interest 
margin 
Share of other 
earning assets 
ROE 
Distance -4.782*** 
(1.156) 
-.500*** 
(.115) 
2.152*** 
(.506) 
-1.311** 
(.570) 
Dummy (financial crisis) .978 
(2.258) 
.311** 
(.151) 
-2.772*** 
(.921) 
.684 
(1.084) 
Distance × Dummy (financial crisis) -2.339* 
(1.385) 
-.255*** 
(.091) 
-.500 
(.504) 
.562 
(.736) 
Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (no. of banks) 1307 (254) 1307 (254) 1301 (253) 1304 (254) 
Goodness of fit .178 .360 .690 .147 
Note: The numbers in parentheses denote errors of the coefficients.  *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10% 
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Table 9. Estimation results on the effects of stock market development on distance constraints 
Dependent variables 
 Loan growth 
rate 
Net interest 
margin 
Share of other 
earning assets 
ROE 
Panel A: Number of publicly listed companies 
Distance -9.276*** 
(1.093) 
-.400*** 
(.135) 
4.324*** 
(.483) 
-1.643** 
(.729) 
Number of listed companies .384 
(3.728) 
-.129 
(.278) 
-4.759** 
(2.039) 
-3.349 
(2.097) 
Distance × Number of listed 
companies 
3.294* 
(1.956) 
.634*** 
(.171) 
-2.864*** 
(1.087) 
1.964* 
(1.190) 
Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (no. of banks) 1285 (250) 1285 (250) 1279 (249) 1282 (250) 
Goodness of fit .158 .360 .680 .144 
Panel B: Stock market capitalization  
Distance -8.371*** 
(1.109) 
-.402*** 
(.134) 
3.380*** 
(.557) 
-1.485** 
(.633) 
Stock market capitalization -.088*** 
(.019) 
-.007** 
(.003) 
-.040** 
(.015) 
-.003 
(.012) 
Distance × Stock market 
capitalization 
.026*** 
(.010) 
.003*** 
(.001) 
.007 
(.005) 
.007 
(.004) 
Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (no. of banks) 1267 (246) 1267 (246) 1261 (245) 1264 (246) 
Goodness of fit .164 .354 .678 .110 
Panel C: Stock market turnover rate  
Distance -8.857*** 
(1.325) 
-.423*** 
(.083) 
1.450*** 
(.568) 
-1.462** 
(.645) 
Stock market turnover rate .028 
(.019) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.010 
(.006) 
.011 
(.009) 
Distance × Stock market turnover 
rate 
.036** 
(.016) 
.000 
(.001) 
-.011** 
(.005) 
.007 
(.006) 
Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (no. of banks) 1273 (248) 1273 (248) 1267 (247) 1270 (248) 
Goodness of fit .164 .413 .689 .130 
Note: The numbers in parentheses denote errors of the coefficients.  *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. 
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Table 10. Estimation results on the effects of concentration level on distance constraints 
Dependent variables 
 Loan growth 
rate 
Net interest 
margin 
Share of other 
earning assets 
ROE 
Distance -13.518*** 
(3.199) 
-1.525*** 
(.243) 
4.533*** 
(1.367) 
-3.247* 
(1.679) 
Concentration -.088 
(.084) 
-.001 
(.006) 
-.012 
(.041) 
-.128*** 
(.044) 
Distance × Concentration .113** 
(.051) 
.014*** 
(.003) 
-.047** 
(.022) 
.024 
(.027) 
Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (no. of banks) 1289 (252) 1289 (252) 1283 (251) 1286 (252) 
Goodness of fit .175 .377 .693 .147 
Note: The numbers in parentheses denote errors of the coefficients.  *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. 
 
Table 11. Estimation results on the effects of subsidiary hierarchy on distance constraints 
Dependent variables 
 Loan growth 
rate 
Net interest 
margin 
Share of other 
earning assets 
ROE 
Distance -5.356*** 
(1.425) 
-.489*** 
(.121) 
2.470*** 
(.516) 
-1.066* 
(.648) 
Hierarchy .566* 
(.338) 
-.048* 
(.024) 
.319*** 
(.110) 
.416*** 
(.150) 
Distance × Hierarchy .550** 
(.268) 
.035* 
(.018) 
-.199*** 
(.075) 
.249** 
(.099) 
Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (no. of banks) 1307 (254) 1307 (254) 1301 (253) 1304 (254) 
Goodness of fit .187 .362 .690 .151 
Note: The numbers in parentheses denote errors of the coefficients.  *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. 
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Table 12. Robustness Tests 
Dependent variables 
 Loan growth 
rate 
Net interest 
margin 
Share of other 
earning assets 
ROE 
Distance -31.808*** 
(6.223) 
-1.470*** 
(.462) 
5.466*** 
(1.804) 
-10.471*** 
(2.581) 
Dummy (M&A) 7.352*** 
(2.712) 
.627*** 
(.189) 
  
Distance × Dummy (M&A) -.642 
(1.764) 
-.227 
(.159) 
  
History -5.121*** 
(1.839) 
-.181 
(.148) 
1.189** 
(.501) 
 
Distance × History 3.323*** 
(1.013) 
.267*** 
(.087) 
-.691** 
(.280) 
 
Dummy (information institutes) -4.516 
(3.004) 
-.197 
(.140) 
  
Distance × Dummy (information 
institutes) 
4.617* 
(2.542) 
.194* 
(.116) 
  
Dummy (same language) -20.521** 
(10.121) 
 11.700*** 
(3.545) 
 
Distance × Dummy (same language) 11.736** 
(4.768) 
 -4.218** 
(1.652) 
 
Dummy (same region)  -.371 
(.558) 
 -14.025*** 
(5.205) 
Distance × Dummy (same region)  .909*** 
(.330) 
 6.252** 
(2.626) 
Host financial deepening -.258*** 
(.090) 
-.052*** 
(.005) 
 -.044 
(.035) 
Distance × Host financial deepening .138*** 
(.049) 
.012*** 
(.003) 
 .083*** 
(.017) 
Dummy (financial crisis) .157 
(2.942) 
.754*** 
(.151) 
  
Distance × Dummy (financial crisis) -.529 
(1.716) 
.045 
(.101) 
  
Number of listed companies .107 
(5.412) 
-.153 
(.286) 
.386 
(2.374) 
.106 
(2.318) 
Distance × Number of listed companies 4.802 
(2.939) 
-.056 
(.236) 
2.579 
(1.614) 
2.550* 
(1.537) 
Stock market capitalization -.040 
(.048) 
.001 
(.003) 
  
Distance × Stock market capitalization -.042 
(.027) 
-.002 
(.002) 
  
Stock market turnover rate .021 
(.021) 
 -.010 
(.006) 
 
Distance × Stock market turnover rate .029* 
(.017) 
 -.010* 
(.005) 
 
Concentration .157 
(.137) 
-.005 
(.006) 
.043 
(.038) 
 
Distance × Concentration .075 
(.074) 
-.003 
(.004) 
-.028 
(.024) 
 
Hierarchy 1.801*** 
(.456) 
.055 
(.032) 
.165 
(.146) 
.632*** 
(.175) 
Distance × Hierarchy .351 
(.324) 
-.033 
(.023) 
-.174* 
(.102) 
.279** 
(.110) 
Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (no. of banks) 1213 (235) 1217 (236) 1236 (242) 1263 (245) 
Goodness of fit .178 .382 .663 .145 
Note: The numbers in parentheses denote errors of the coefficients.  *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. 
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Table A1. Correlation coefficients among bank performance dimensions 
 Loan growth rate Net interest margin Share of other earning assets ROE 
Loan growth rate 1.000    
Net interest margin 0.056*** 1.000   
Share of other earning assets -0.171*** -0.191*** 1.000  
ROE 0.088*** 0.109*** 0.004 1.000 
Note: *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% 
 
Table A2. Correlation coefficients among distance and subsidiary characteristics 
 Distance Liquidity Capitalization Size Riskiness 
Distance  1.000     
Liquidity -0.039* 1.000    
Capitalization 0.061*** 0.024 1.000   
Size -0.282*** -0.107*** -0.173*** 1.000  
Riskiness -0.006 -0.028 0.019 -0.012 1.000 
Note: *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% 
 
    
 Table A3. Correlation coefficients among distance and parent bank characteristics 
 Distance Parent bank mass Parent bank liquidity Parent bank capitalization 
Distance 1.000    
Parent bank mass 0.497*** 1.000   
Parent bank liquidity -0.060*** 0.024 1.000  
Parent bank capitalization 0.056*** -0.188*** -0.141*** 1.000 
Note: *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% 
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Table A4. List of multinational banks and the distribution of foreign subsidiaries in emerging and 
developing economies 
 Multination bank Home country Host countries 
   
1 ABN Amro NL PL, RO, HU, KZ, AR, BR, CL, CO, MX, MY, 
PK, PH  
2 Allied Irish Banks plc IE PL 
3 Alpha Bank AE GR MK, RS, RO 
4 American Express US BR, CL, MX, UY 
5 Australia and New Zealand Banking Group AU ID 
6 Banca Intesa IT HR, BA, RU, RS, SK 
7 Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA - BNL IT AR, BR, UY 
8 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA ES AR, CL, CO, MX, PY, PE, UY, VE 
9 Banco Bradesco SA BR AR 
10 Banco Comercial Portugues SA PT PL, TR 
11 Banco do Brasil S.A. BR CL, PA 
12 Banco Itau SA BR AR 
13 Bank Austria Creditanstalt AT HR, SK, SI 
14 Bank of America US BR, MX, HK, ID 
15 Bank of China CN RU, HK, MY 
16 Bank of Nova Scotia (The) - SCOTIABANK CA AR, CL, MX, PE, CR, JM, PA, SV, MY 
17 Bank of Tokyo - Mitsubishi UFJ JP PL, BR, MX, IN, MY 
18 Barclays Plc GB EG, ZA 
19 Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG DE BG, HR, CZ, HU, LV, PL, RO, HR, SK, SI 
20 Bayerische Landesbank DE BG, HU 
21 BNP Paribas FR BG, HU, PL, RU, UA, BR, MX, PE, PA, CN, 
ID, EG 
22 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce CIBC CA JM, SG 
23 Citigroup US CZ, HU, KZ, PL, RO, RU, SK, UA, BR, CL, 
CO, MX, PY, PE, VE, HK, IN, KR, MY, SG, 
HN, PA, TT 
24 Commerzbank AG DE HU, PL, RU, ID 
25 Commonwealth Bank of Australia AU ID 
26 Credit Agricole FR AM, CZ, HU, PL, RU, RS, SK, UA, AR, BR, 
UY, TR, EG 
27 Credit Suisse CH RU, BR 
28 Creditanstalt AT CZ, HU, PL 
29 Danske Bank A/S DK PL, RU 
30 DBS Group Holdings Ltd SG HK, ID, PH, TH 
31 Deutsche Bank AG DE HU, PL, RU, AR, BR, CL, UY, MY 
32 Dexia BE RU, SK, TR 
33 DnB Nor ASA NO RU 
34 Dresdner Bank AG DE HR, CZ, RU, BR, CL, MX 
35 DZ Bank AG DE HU, PL 
36 Emporiki Bank of Greece SA GR AL, BG, RO 
37 Erste Group Bank AG AT HR, CZ, HU, RO, RS, SK 
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38 Fortis Bank BE PL, TR, HK 
39 GE Capital US CZ, HU, PL, BR, MX 
40 HSBC GB AM, PL, RU, TR, AR, BR, CL, CO, MX, PE, 
UY, KZ, MY, EG 
41 Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank AT BA, HR, RS, SI 
42 ING Bank NV NL PL, RU, UA, AR, CL, MX, PY, UY, IN, ID, SG 
43 JP Morgan Chase US BR, MX, VE, MY 
44 KBC Group BE CZ, HU, PL, RU, SK 
45 Kookmin Bank KR HK 
46 Lloyds TSB Bank PLC GB AR, BR 
47 National Bank of Greece SA GR BG, MK, RO, RS, TR 
48 Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale NORD/LB DE LV, LT, PL 
49 Nordea Bank AB SE PL, RU 
50 Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited 
OCBC 
SG ID, MY 
51 Piraeus Bank SA GR AL, BG, RO, RS 
52 ProCredit Holding AG DE GE, MD, UA 
53 Rabobank Nederland NL PL, BR, IN, ID, SG 
54 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich AG - RZB AT AL, BY, BA, BG, HR, CZ, HU, PL, RO, RU, 
RS, SK, SI, UA 
55 Resona Bank Ltd JP ID 
56 Sampo Bank Plc FI EE, LV, LT 
57 Sanpaolo IMI IT HU, RO, SI 
58 Santander Central Hispano ES AR, BR, CL, CO, MX, PE, UY, VE, PA, PH 
59 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken  SE EE, LV, LT, UA 
60 Societe Generale FR BG, HR, CZ, PL, RO, RU, RS, SI, AR, BR, MX, 
ID, EG 
61 Standard Chartered Bank GB CO, PE, HK, KR, MY, TH 
62 Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation JP BR, ID 
63 Svenska Handelsbanken SE RU 
64 Swedbank AB SE EE, LV, LT, RU 
65 UBS CH BR 
66 UniCredit SpA IT BA, BG, CZ, HR, PL, RO, RU, SK, UA, TR 
67 Veneto Banca Holding scpa IT HR, MD 
68 Volksbank AT HR, RO, RS, SK 
69 West LB  DE HU, PL, RU, BR 
Notes: AL=Albania, AM=Armenia, AR=Argentina, AT=Austria, AU=Australia, BA=Bosnia & Herzegovina, BE=Belgium, BR=Brazil, 
BG=Bulgaria, BY=Belarus, CA=Canada, CH= Switzerland, CL=Chile, CN=China, CO=Colombia, CR= Costa Rica, CZ=Czech, 
DE=Germany, DK=Denmark, EE=Estonia, EG=Egypt, ES=Spain, FI=Finland, FR=France, GB=UK, GE=Georgia, GR=Greece, HK=Hong 
Kong, HN=Honduras, HR=Croatia, HU=Hungary, ID=Indonesia, IE=Ireland, IN=India, IT=Italy, JM=Jamaica, JP=Japan, KR=Korea, 
KZ=Kazahkstan, LT=Lithuania, LV=Latvia, MD=Moldova, MK=Macedonia, MX=Mexico, MY=Malaysia, NL=Netherland, NO=Norway, 
PA= Panama, PE= Peru, PH=Philippines, PK=Pakistan, PL=Poland, PT= Portugal, PY=Paraguay, RO=Romania, RS=Serbia, RU=Russia, 
SE=Sweden, SG=Singapore, SK=Slovakia, SI=Slovenia, SV=El Salvador, TH= Thailand, TR=Turkey, TT=Trinidad &Tobago, UA=Ukraine, 
US=United States, UY=Uruguay, VE=Venezuela, ZA=South Africa 
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   Notes 
                                                             
 
1 Soft information means the information that cannot be directly verified by anyone except the agent who 
produces it. As opposed to “hard” information, which can be credibly verified by documents or other 
evidence, “soft” information cannot be unambiguously documented and passed on from loan officers to 
their superiors. 
 
2 Mian (2006) and Claessens and van Horsen (2009) only use dummies to measure the distance between 
host and home markets.  
 
3 The effect of parent banks on the behaviors of subsidiaries is studied in the “internal capital market” 
literature, which argues that the financial strength in parent banks would affect the availability of resources 
from the parent to the subsidiaries. Related works include Gilbert (1991), Houston et al. (1997), Houston 
and James (1998), Campello (2002), Holod and Peek (2006), Ashcraft (2008) and De Haas and van 
Lelyveld (2009). 
 
4 Related research how foreign subsidiaries may be affects by factors in their home countries can be seen in 
Peek and Rosengren (2000), Goldberger (2005) and some others. 
 
5 53 out of 69 multinational banks in our sample are listed in the largest 100 banks in the world as of 2005 
(in terms of the book value of equity capital). See The Banker, Vol. 155, No. 953. 
 
6 Branches are not included in our dataset. 
 
7 The ratio of a subsidiary’s total assets to the conglomerate’s total assets is around 1% on average and the 
median value is even much lower (only 0.2%). See Table 1. 
 
8 The single item of the tested factor would be interpreted as it may affect banks’ behavior via other 
unidentified channels. 
 
9 Recently, the role of legal system in determining the development of financial system has received an 
intensive attention (see La Porta et al. (1998), Beck et al. (2003) etc.) 
 
10 The official languages in our sampled countries include English, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, French, 
Chinese and others. In total 43 different languages. The legal origins are categorized into French, German, 
English, Scandinavian and socialist legal systems, following La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. 
(2007). Regions are grouped into North America, South America, Central America, Europe, East Asia, 
South Asia, Southeast Asia, Mideast, Central Asia and Russia, Australia and New Zealand, and Africa.  
 
11 Our results are consistent with Claessens and van Horen (2009), who also find that the same language 
and region improve the performance of foreign banks but the same legal system does not. 
